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Comments
Public School Prayer and the First Amendment:
Reconciling Constitutional Claims
I. INTRODUCTION
"A grave responsibility confronts the Court whenever in the
course of litigation it must reconcile the conflicting claims of lib-
erty and authority. But when the liberty invoked is liberty of con-
science, and the authority is authority to safeguard the nation's
fellowship, judicial conscience is put to its severest test."' With
these portentous words, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in 1940, began
the majority opinion in a zealously argued case that augured well
for producing a landmark decision.' But the very same judicial di-
lemma in which he found himself has apparently confronted the
Supreme Court of the United States whenever it has been called
on to evaluate any government action in light of the religion
clauses of the first amendment, which provide that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof."' In analyzing the commands of these
clauses in the light of Justice Frankfurter's statement, it should be
clear that "liberty of conscience" is precisely the value that both
the establishment clause and the free exercise clause seek to pro-
tect. When this liberty comes into conflict with authority of any
kind, whether it be "authority to safeguard the nation's fellow-
ship" or any other government interest, the stage has inevitably
been set for a case of constitutional dimensions."
1. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591 (1940) (Frankfurter, J., for the
Court).
2. The Supreme Court in Gobitis held that a public school district may, consistently
with the Constitution, require all pupils under its control to participate in a flag-saluting
ceremony, even those pupils whose religious convictions are thereby violated. The case was
overruled three years later by West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) in which Justice Frankfurter dissented.
3. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
4. Significantly, the religion clauses were not the subject of much litigation in the Su-
preme Court until the middle of the twentieth century, apparently because neither of the
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While many facets of public life and government action have
been exposed to judicial scrutiny under these clauses, few have
plagued federal courts as persistently as has that of religious activ-
ity in publicly supported schools." While this issue has at times
been neatly categorized as that of school prayer, it is more accu-
rately viewed as a large area involving devotional exercises and
other types of quasi-religious activity in public elementary and sec-
ondary schools, and occasionally at tax-supported colleges and uni-
versities.6 This comment will seek to clarify the decisions which
the Supreme Court has already handed down in this sensitive area,
and which have been followed and expanded by other federal
courts.7 It will then explore the specific issues which the Court has
not yet decided, but on which an eventual ruling is inevitable, con-
cluding that the outcome of these cases will hinge on which of two
currently existing lines of cases the Court chooses to follow.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
The applicability of the establishment and free exercise clauses
to the states, as a result of which such state action as statutes re-
quiring or authorizing school prayer would eventually be chal-
lenged, was settled in Cantwell v. Connecticut.s Justice Roberts,
writing for the Court, stated: "The First Amendment declares that
clauses was held to be binding on the states until Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940). But once it was established through Cantwell, and clarified further through Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), that the states and the federal government would be
held to the same standard of scrutiny when invasion of religious freedom is involved, the
Court eventually found itself confronted with numerous instances of state action to which to
apply that standard.
5. See, e.g., Justice Brennan's historical analysis in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 230-304 (1963). (Brennan, J., concurring). For a discussion of Schempp, see
infra notes 43-70 and accompanying text.
6. The pervasive and significant role played by public education in the United States,
and the symbolism traditionally attached to it as a melting pot or a citadel of democracy,
have perhaps been the major causes of the amount of constitutional litigation involving pub-
lic school activities. Courts have been aware of these factors. See, e.g., Brandon v. Board of
Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 973 (2d Cir. 1980). Publicly supported institutions of higher learning
are also, though less frequently, involved. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
See also infra text accompanying note 83. However, the standards for such institutions are
different from those for elementary and secondary schools. See infra note 86 and accompa-
nying text.
7. The fact that most plaintiffs have chosen to litigate this federal issue in a federal
forum has kept the dockets of state courts relatively free of these cases, although the appli-
cable federal precedents are frequently cited in state court opinions. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Huntington Beach School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1977) and Trietley v.
Board of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 409 N.Y.S. 2d 912 (1978).
8. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as
Congress to enact such laws."' He then went on to clarify the dis-
tinction between the two clauses and the standard that must be
used in evaluating legislation under either of them:
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a
double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the ac-
ceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of
conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization as the indi-
vidual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safe-
guards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amend-
ment embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.' 0
Seven years later in Everson v. Board of Education," the Court
gave an expansive interpretation to the establishment clause, the
historical soundness of which has sometimes been questioned, but
from the parameters of which the Court has not retreated. Justice
Black, speaking for a bare majority of the Court, said:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or
remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or pro-
fessing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attend-
ance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called; or whatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a
wall of separation between church and State.""
A year later in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion,'" the Court was urged to disregard, as dicta, a large portion of
this analysis, particularly the theory that the establishment clause
9. Id. at 303.
10. Id. at 303-04.
11. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
12. Id. at 15-16. Everson upheld a program of reimbursement of the public transporta-
tion costs of non-public school students. Id.
13. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). McCollum invalidated a program of religious instruction con-
ducted by members of the clergy in public schools. Id.
1984
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forbids government aid to all religions indiscriminately." However,
the Court declined to do so, and reaffirmed its earlier holding that
the establishment clause binds the states."' Since then the Court
has adhered to this doctrine in all establishment cases, although
the Jeffersonian "wall of separation" language has not risen to the
level of an official judicial gloss on the first amendment, and has
been held not to state an absolute constitutional value.' 6
In evaluating legislation under the establishment clause, the Su-
preme Court has evolved a three-pronged test, each part of which
must be satisfied for a statute to be upheld. This test, which other
federal courts have followed, was enunciated most clearly in
Lemon v. Kurtzman17 in which the Court, through Chief Justice
Burger, stated: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion and . ..finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion.' ,8 The Court in Lemon asserted that these criteria were de-
rived from the earlier cases of Board of Education v. Allen1 and
Walz v. Tax Commission.
20
III. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND STATE-SPONSORED SCHOOL
PRAYER
A. The Emergence of an Issue: The Regents' Prayer Case
The development of the establishment doctrine in cases such as
Everson and McCollum set the stage for the subsequent rulings on
religious exercises in public schools." In 1962, the Supreme Court
first considered the merits of such a practice in Engle v. Vitale.22
14. Id. at 211.
15. Id.
16. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding religious instruction given off
public school premises but as part of the school day). "The First Amendment, however, does
not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of church and state." Id. at
312 (Douglas, J., for the Court).
17. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon struck down statutes in Pennsylvania and Rhode Is-
land providing financial assistance to non-public schools in teaching secular subjects. See
infra note 76.
18. 403 U.S. at 612-13.
19. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). Allen upheld the lending of secular textbooks by the state to
students in non-public schools.
20. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Walz upheld the exemption of church-owned property from a
property tax.
21. See supra note 6 for the significance of public schools in constitutional cases.
22. 370 U.S. 421(1962). Earlier, the Court had dismissed, on grounds of mootness, an
appeal from a state court decision upholding the constitutionality of devotional exercises in
Vol. 22:465
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The plaintiffs in Engel challenged the practice adopted by a Long
Island school district of requiring the use of a non-denomina-
tional prayer as part of opening exercises at the start of each
school day. The prescribed prayer24 had been composed by the
New York Board of Regents in consultation with clergy of different
faiths (hence its popular designation as the Regents' Prayer); its
use was mandatory in each classroom, although no individual stu-
dent could be required to say it.25
Shortly after the adoption of the Regents' Prayer by the school
district, a suit to enjoin it was brought in the Supreme Court for
Nassau County, New York. That court determined that the use of
the prayer as a prescribed school exercise did not violate the estab-
lishment clause.26 Justice Meyer noted with significance that the
traditional concept embraced by the clause had not generally been
deemed to exclude devotional practices from the classroom:
If we turn then from constitutional history to the history of the times, we
find that by 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, "the sepa-
ration of public education from Church entanglements, of the State from
the teaching of religion, was firmly established in the consciousness of the
nation," but that such separation did not extend to the exclusion of prayer
or the reading of the Bible from public school routines.1
The court went on to find that the use of the prayer was more
akin to an accommodation of religion under Zorach v. Clauson2"
than to a promotion of religion, and went on to reject the argu-
ment that a dissenter from the religious practice under challenge
should be able to prevent anyone else form taking part in it.29 The
public schools. See Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950), appeal dis-
missed, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
23. The resolution of the school board was adopted in 1958, pursuant to the authoriza-
tion of the state Board of Regents in 1951. 370 U.S. at 422.
24. "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country." Id.
25. Id. at 430. The voluntary nature of the prayer was ruled immaterial to the estab-
lishment issue. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
26. Engel v. Vitale, 18 Misc.2d 659, 191 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1959).
27. Id. at 674-75, 191 N.Y.S.2d at 472 (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 217 (1948)).
28. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). See supra note 16. Zorach has been relied on by government
bodies in nearly every establishment case since it was decided, and has frequently been used
successfully. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), Walz v. Tax Commission,
397 U.S. 664 (1970), Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). See also supra notes 6, 19
and 20 on those cases. The most recent successful use of Zorach was in Marsh v. Chambers,
103 S. Ct. 3320 (1983) (upholding payment of legislative chaplain with public funds).
29. "Every individual has a constitutional right personally to be free from religion, but
that right is a shield, not a sword, and may not be used to compel others to adopt the same
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trial court also held that the alleged "subtle pressure" placed on
non-conforming students by the public prayer did not render it un-
constitutional,30 and observed significantly that a state-composed
prayer was the only alternative to a sectarian prayer."1
This decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court." Justice Beldock wrote a concurrence which
elaborated on the rationale of the trial court's opinion.
The contention that acknowledgments of and references to Almighty God
are acceptable and desirable in all other phases of our public life but not in
our public schools is, in my judgment, an attempt to stretch far beyond its
breaking point the principle of separation of church and state, and to ob-
scure one's vision to the universally accepted tradition that ours is a nation
founded and nurtured upon belief in God.'3
Finally, with essentially the same rationale, the New York Court of
Appeals affirmed,-4 whereupon the plaintiffs sought review in the
United States Supreme Court, which reversed by a 6-1 vote, with
two Justices not participating."5
Significantly, there was no contention before the Supreme Court
that the prayer was anything but a religious exercise.36 As such, it
was found to be clearly an establishment of religion. Speaking for
the Court, Justice Black stated: "[I]n this country it is no part of
the business of government to compose official prayers for any
group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious pro-
gram carried on by government. '37 He went on to reject both the
non-sectarian character of the prayer and the lack of compulsion of
individual students to recite it as safeguards against first amend-
attitude." 18 Misc.2d at 688, 191 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
30. Id. at 695-96, 191 N.Y.S.2d at 492.
31. Id. at 699, 191 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
32. Engel v. Vitale, 11 A.D.2d 340, 206 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1960).
33. Id. at 345, 206 N.Y.S.2d at 188 (Beldock, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
34. Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 176 N.E.2d 579, 218 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1961).
35. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). Justice Stewart dissented. Justice Frank-
furter, on the verge of retirement from the Court, and Justice White, the newest appointee,
did not participate. Id. at 436.
36. Compare and contrast this with Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) decided a year
later, in which the claim was made that the challenged exercise was not primarily religious
in nature. See infra note 43 and accompanying text. Arguments of this type have also been
made in more recent establishment cases, and are usually rejected. See, e.g., Donnelly v.
Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150 (D.R.I. 1981), afl'd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 1766 (1983) (erection by city government of nativity scene as part of Christmas
display held unconstitutional, rejecting contention that creche is not a primarily religious
symbol).
37. 370 U.S. at 425.
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ment attack.38 At length he concluded:
It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate govern-
ment in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanction-
ing official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people
themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious
guidance.39
The only dissenter was Justice Stewart, who attached signifi-
cance to the voluntary nature of individual participation, which, in
his view, preserved the exercise from constitutional attack.
4 0
B. Expansion of the Ban: The Abington and Murray Cases
While the Engel decision might have been read narrowly as ban-
ning only state-composed prayers, 41 an equally potent controversy
had been developing in lower courts regarding the prescribed use
in public schools of prayers and religious exercises derived from
other sources.42 Only one Term after Engel, two such cases reached
the Supreme Court and were combined in Abington School Dis-
trict v. Schempp.
43
The lead case originated in a Pennsylvania township in which a
38. "Neither the fact that the prayer may be denominationally neutral nor the fact
that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it from the
limitations of the Establishment Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause, of the
First Amendment . Id. at 430 (Black, J., for the Court).
39. Id. at 435.
40. Id. at 444 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
I cannot see how an "official religion" is established by letting those who want to say
a prayer say it. On the contrary, I think that to deny the wish of these school children
to join in reciting this prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in the spiri-
tual heritage of our Nation.
Id. at 445. Justice Stewart continued in the same vein. "[W]e deal here not with the estab-
lishment of a state church, which would, of course, be constitutionally impermissible, but
with whether school children who want to begin their day by joining in prayer must be
prohibited from doing so." Id.
The Engel decision provoked a generally adverse reaction from legislators and the public.
See, e.g., proposals for a constitutional amendment mentioned in Sutherland, Establish-
ment According to Engel, 76 HARv. L. REV. 25, 50 (1962), as well as thoughtful comment
from legal scholars who were uncertain as to where the Court would go next. See e.g.,
Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1031 (1963).
41. Such a narrow interpretation was, in fact, not necessary in light of the statement
in Engel that "government . . .should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning
official prayers." 370 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added). See supra text accompanying note 39.
42. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950), had, for example, in-
volved the mandatory reading from the Old Testament in New Jersey schools. See supra
note 22.
43. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Schempp affirmed a lower federal court in Pennsylvania. ( 201
F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1962)). Its companion case, Murray v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
reversed the Maryland Court of Appeals (228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698 (1962)).
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local high school, pursuant to a 1949 state statute requiring the
reading, without comment, of at least ten verses of the Bible at the
start of each school day, conducted a morning exercise consisting
of the reading of Scripture and the saying of the Lord's Prayer.
Plaintiffs, a Unitarian family who, as they testified, rejected a lit-
eral interpretation of the Bible, sued in federal district court to
enjoin the practice which they claimed fostered such a view." The
district court found that the purpose of the statute was to intro-
duce a religious ceremony into the schools, and that as such it was
unconstitutional. 8 Later, the statute was amended to allow pupils
to be excused during the exercises," and a second trial was held
where, once again, an injunction issued.47 The school district ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court.' 8
Murray v. Curlett,49 challenged the practice in the Baltimore
public schools of conducting devotional exercises pursuant to a
1905 Maryland statute which directed the use of either Bible read-
ings or the Lord's Prayer as a part of the official school day. A
student and his mother, both atheists, sought mandamus to com-
pel the Baltimore school board to rescind the regulation prescrib-
ing the exercise.50 The board, acting on an opinion by the Attorney
General of Maryland, had allowed individual students to be ex-
cused, but although the student plaintiff availed himself of this op-
tion, he and his mother continued to allege that the prayer exer-
cises nonetheless caused them harm inasmuch as they amounted to
44. Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
Because of the subsequent amendment of the statute to allow excusal of pupils, the judg-
ment striking it down was vacated, 364 U.S. 298 (1960), and on remand the statute as
amended was also found unconstitutional. 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
45. The court found it significant, for example, that the students were held to a
stricter than usual standard of deportment and attention during the Bible reading, thus
suggesting that it was regarded by school authorities as akin to a worship service. This may
be considered a foreshadowing of the "secular purpose-primary effect" doctrine of Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See supra note 17. See also infra note 76.
46. See supra note 44. One of the student plaintiffs had earlier sought, and was de-
nied, permission to leave the room during the devotional exercise. Schempp v. School Dist.
of Abington Township, 177 F. Supp. at 401.
47. On remand, the father of the student plaintiffs testified that he felt exercise of the
excusal option by his children would expose them to opprobrium before their peers. 201 F.
Supp. at 818.
48. The appeal was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958), which authorizes a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court from any judgment of a three-judge district court, such
as was here convened to enjoin a state statute. Probable jurisdiction was noted, 371 U.S. 807
(1962).
49. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
50. Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d 698 (1962).
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official government disapproval of atheism.6' The Maryland Court
of Appeals denied relief by a 4-3 vote, holding that the Constitu-
tion does not protect such plaintiffs from embarrassment.52 The
Supreme Court granted certioraris and consolidated the case with
Schempp.
The majority opinion deciding both cases54 was an expansion of
McCoJJum 55 and Engel.5' Justice Clark, for the Court, wrote, "In
light of the history of the First Amendment and of our cases inter-
preting and applying its requirement, we hold that the practices at
issue and the laws requiring them are unconstitutional. ' 67 The
Court considered significant the fact that the Abington School Dis-
trict provided its teachers with a particular translation of the Bible
to use in the exercises, 5  and that the exercises were clearly reli-
gious in nature and so intended. 5 In applying the first amendment
to these cases, the Court announced the beginning of the "secular
purpose-primary effect" test that it would later apply to all reli-
gion cases.60 Once again, the lack of compulsion of any individual
student was found to be immaterial, because a violation of the es-
tablishment clause, unlike a prohibition of free exercise, requires
only sponsorship rather than coercion. 61 In a brief concurring opin-
ion, Justice Douglas dwelt on the promotion of religious values by
government as constituting the chief constitutional vibe of the
practices under challenge.
62
The most extensive opinion in the case was the concurrence of
51. 374 U.S. at 207. See 228 Md. at 242, 179 A.2d at 699.
52. 228 Md. at 250, 179 A.2d at 704 (citing Zorach, 343 U.S. at 311 n.7). See supra
note 15 for a discussion of Zorach.
53. 371 U S. 809 (1962).
54. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
55. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
56. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
57. 374 U.S. at 205 (Clark, J., for the Court).
58. Only the King James Version was supplied by the school district. Students were,
however, allowed to bring in other versions to use on their own initiative. Id. at 207.
59. Once again, as in Engel, the purpose of the practice was accorded great signifi-
cance. See supra note 45.
60. "[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." 374
U.S. at 222. (Clark, J., for the Court). This would later evolve into the three-pronged test
enunciated most clearly in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See infra note
76 and accompanying text and supra note 17 and accompanying text.
61. 374 U.S. at 223. See supra note 38 for discussion of the same issue in Engel.
62. "[T]he Establishment Clause ... forbids the State to employ its facilities or funds
in a way that gives any church, or all churches, greater strength in our society than it would
have by relying on its members alone." 374 U.S. at 229 (Douglas, J., concurring).
1984 473
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 22:465
Justice Brennan, who examined the issues in terms of a detailed
history of the first amendment and of American public education.
He observed: "Americans regard the public schools as a most vital
civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of gov-
ernment. It is therefore understandable that the constitutional
prohibitions encounter their severest test when they are sought to
be applied in the school classroom."" He noted that in the interval
between the adoption of the first amendment and the present day,
the nature of American education had changed by becoming more
government-controlled, and the country had become religiously
more pluralistic." He also saw fit to answer the contention that the
purpose of the establishment clause was to prevent Congress from
disestablishing the state churches of the eighteenth century, by ob-
serving that all such churches had already been disestablished by
the states at the time the fourteenth amendment was ratified,6 5
and that Cantwell, of course, held that amendment to impose the
requirements of the first amendment on the states.8 6 He also ex-
amined the history of state court decisions that had reached simi-
lar results on the subject of school Bible reading,67 and suggested
that the only school exercises of this type that would pass constitu-
tional muster might be a moment of silence. 6
63. Id. at 230 (Brennan, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 238-41 (Brennan, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 255 (Brennan, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 253-54 (Brennan, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 275 (Brennan, J., concurring). Such cases included People ex rel. Ring v.
Board of Educ., 245 IMl. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910); Herold v. Parish Bd. of School Directors,
136 La. 1034, 68 So. 116 (1915); State ex rel. Finger v. Weedman, 55 S.D. 343, 226 N.W. 348
(1929); State ex rel. Dearle v. Frazier, 102 Wash. 369, 173 P. 35 (1918); State ex rel. Weiss v.
District Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967 (1890), all of which were decided on state constitu-
tional grounds. Significantly, although Justice Brennan acknowledged his indebtedness for
these cases to J. Harrison, The Bible, the Constitution, and Public Education, 20 TENN. L.
REV. 363 (1962) he failed to mention the contrary decisions mentioned in the same article,
such as People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 P. 610 (1927); Wilkerson v. City
of Rome, 152 Ga. 762, 110 S.E. 895 (1922); Moore v. Monroe, 64 Iowa 367, 20 N.W. 475
(1884); Billard v. Board of Educ., 69 Kan. 53, 76 P. 422 (1904); Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me.
376 (1854); Pfeiffer v. Board of Educ. of Detroit, 118 Mich. 560, 77 N.W. 250 (1898). In
these cases school Bible reading was upheld, generally on the now discredited theory that
the Bible is not a sectarian document.
68. 374 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has not yet ad-
dressed the precise question, but a legislatively prescribed period of silence at the start of
the school day was upheld in Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976). Such
provisions have, however, been struck down in Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161 (M.D.
Tenn. 1982) and Duffy v. Las Cruces Public Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013 (D.N.M. 1983), on
findings that the legislative history manifests an intent to promote a religious activity and
hence, under the Lemon test, a secular purpose is absent. No such legislative history existed
in Gaines.
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Justice Goldberg, joined by Justice Harlan, concurred but
warned that a requirement of strict government neutrality in reli-
gious matters might go too far."' Once again, the only dissent came
from Justice Stewart, who would have considered the free exercise
claims of those students and parents who favored Bible reading,
but suggested that religious exercises might best be held outside
school hours. 0
IV. MORE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: FREE EXERCISE AND THE
VOLUNTARY PRAYER ISSUE
The immediate reaction to Engel and Schempp was a general
reluctance on the part of school officials to countenance any reli-
gious activity during the school day, even when such activity was
initiated by students themselves.71 While the claim of free exercise
of religion was often made, with the contention that schools were
required to permit voluntary prayer, such claims were generally re-
69. "[U)ntutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to invocation or ap-
proval of results which partake not simply of ... noninterference and noninvolvement with
the religious ... but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or
even active, hostility to the religious." 374 U.S. at 306. (Goldberg, J., concurring).
70. [A] compulsory state educational system so structures a child's life, that if reli-
gious exercises are held to be an impermissible activity in schools, religion is placed at
an artificial and state-created disadvantage. Viewed in this light, permission of such
exercises for those who want them is necessary if the schools are truly to be neutral in
the matter of religion. And a refusal to permit religious exercises thus is seen, not as
the realization of state neutrality, but rather as the establishment of a religion of
secularism, or at the least, as government support of the beliefs of those who think
that religious exercises should be conducted only in private.
Id. at 313 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
[T]he duty laid upon government in connection with religious exercises in the public
schools is that of refraining from so structuring the school environment as to put any
kind of pressure on a child to participate in those exercises; it is not that of providing
an atmosphere in which children are kept scrupulously insulated from any awareness
that some of their fellows may want to open the school day with prayer, or of the fact
that there exist in our pluralistic society differences of religious belief.
Id. at 316-17 (Stewart, J., dissenting). "[R]eligious exercises are not constitutionally invalid
if they simply reflect differences which exist in the society from which the school draws its
pupils. They become constitutionally invalid only if their administration places the sanction
of secular authority behind one or more particular religious or irreligious beliefs." Id. at 317-
18 (Stewart, J., dissenting). "[Ilf such exercises were held either before or after the official
school day.., it could hardly be contended that the exercises did anything more than to
provide an opportunity for the voluntary expression of religious belief." Id. at 318 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
71. See infra notes 72-73. Proposals were also introduced in Congress to overrule En-
gel by constitutional amendment, and even to rewrite the first amendment. See Sutherland,
supra note 40, at 50.
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jected by federal courts.72 At first, the prayers were sought to be
said in the classroom, and hence would be part of the official
school program,7 s but later the question of student-initiated prayer
meetings arose, and these were also found impermissible by both
federal and state courts.
7 4
Two recent federal court cases may be considered illustrative of
this trend. In Collins v. Chandler Unified School District,75 a stu-
dent council sought permission to open school assemblies with Bi-
ble readings. Although the practice was student-initiated, a federal
court found that an assembly was nevertheless a school function
and that authorization of these practices was tantamount to estab-
lishment of religion. Affirming this decision, the court of appeals
considered an assembly with prayers incorporated into it to be a
state function with no secular purpose under the rationale of
Lemon v. Kurtzman.7 6 It also found that the subtle pressure
placed on students to conform served to undermine their auton-
omy.77 Curiously, the lower court, in enjoining the prayers at the
student assemblies, went to the point of maintaining that any pub-
lic prayer in a public school would be unconstitutional,7 citing to
this effect Stein v. Oshinsky 9 which deals only with the extent of
72. See e.g., Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 952
(1965) (state not required by free exercise clause to allow voluntary prayers). See also Bran-
don v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), infra note 81.
73. See, e.g., Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965). More recently, on the
subject of voluntary but officially encouraged classroom prayer see Jaffree v. Board of
School Commissioners, 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala. 1983), rev'd sub noma, Jaffree v. Wal-
lace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983).
74. Generally, the findings were based on the grounds of "excessive entanglement,"
the third prong of the Lemon test. See infra note 76. Decisions reaching such results include
Hunt v. Board of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D. W.Va. 1971) (school board forbade use of
school for prayer meeting, held not a denial of free exercise); Johnson v. Huntington Beach
Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App.3d 1, 137 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
877 (1977) (school district, acting on legal advice, denied school facilities for Bible study
club. The court held that denial was required by the establishment clause and does not
violate free exercise.) (A lengthy dissent was authored by McDaniel, J.); Trietley v. Board.
of Educ., 65 A.D.2d 1, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1978) (school board may and must, under first
amendment, deny formation of high school Bible clubs).
75. 470 F. Supp. 959 (D. Ariz. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981).
76. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
77. 644 F.2d at 761, citing with approval, Goodwin v. Cross County School Dist. No. 7,
394 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
78. 470 F. Supp. at 963.
79. 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965) (students sought, and were denied, permission to say
grace at meals in school; on suit by parents to compel such authorization, denial affirmed).
See supra note 72.
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administrative discretion in curbing such practices. 80
Perhaps the ultimate result was reached in Brandon v. Board of
Education,"' in which a group of students sought to conduct volun-
tary prayer meetings in a classroom at the start of the school day.
The district court held that the establishment clause forbids mak-
ing school facilities available to students for this purpose, and dis-
missed their free exercise and free expression claims on the
grounds that a school is not a public forum which must be open to
the expression of all views. Also considered significant (and
stressed on appeal) was the fact that although the proposed prayer
meetings would take place before the beginning of class periods,
they would occur at a time when the building was open and pupils




At the present, it would seem that the trend in this area of con-
stitutional law is toward discouraging, if not banning altogether,
any public display of religious devotion as such, as part of the offi-
cial educational activity of a public school. Whenever both estab-
lishment and free exercise claims are advanced in the same case,
the former always appear to prevail. But there does not appear to
be an intrinsic need for such a priority, and in fact there are signs
that it may be eroding. In the 1981 case of Widmar v. Vincent,"
the Supreme Court held, on free exercise grounds, that a religious
group may not be denied equal access to the facilities of a public
university such as is granted to other student groups." While the
Court has made a distinction between colleges and lower schools
on the basis of, among other things, lack of compulsion to attend
the former, 5 it is significant that, in this context, the free exercise
80. Stein is correctly cited, however, for its free exercise holding.
81. 487 F. Supp. 1219 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 637 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1123 (1981).
82. More recently, a contrary decision was reached in Bender v. Williamaport Area
School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983) which held that a school is a limited public
forum and questioned whether Brandon is still valid after Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263
(1981). See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
83. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
84. At least one district court has applied the rationale of Widmar to a high school.
Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983). See supra note
82.
85. See Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (upholding
compulsory military training at state university over religious scruples of pacifist student).
On the significance of voluntary attendance, see also Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township
1984
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claims of students prevailed over any question of establishment of
religion.8 The Court has, in the past, required a state to affirma-
tively accommodate the religious beliefs of its citizens even when
this would require treating different religious groups differently,
87
thus indicating that the right to free exercise of religion may, at
times, prevail over establishment considerations. Therefore,
whether the voluntary prayer cases will continue to be decided
against the students is not so certain as the lower court decisions
in that area may indicate. 88 The Supreme Court has not yet ad-
dressed itself clearly to the precise issues involved in reconciling
the rights of those students who wish to incorporate some devo-
tional practice into their school day,89 and the need to avoid any
impression of government sponsorship or promotion of a particular
type of devotion. The ability of a specific policy to achieve this
balance would in any case be the subject of debate in individual
school boards. But if federal courts are indeed to take roles of lead-
ership in shaping and defining fundamental values, they should
certainly show some awareness of the need to maintain this bal-
ance and avoid the tendency to over-generalize about constitu-
tional values. The Court may be entirely correct in maintaining
that the first amendment requires governments to pursue a course
of strict neutrality in the religious sphere, but it may well be asked
whether such neutrality is best served by letting one portion of
that amendment completely swallow up another. The admonition
for government not to hinder religion is equally as binding as the
admonition not to advance it, and the courts should above all seek
to keep both directives in perspective when dealing with such a
sensitive facet of public life.
James J. O'Connell, Jr.
School Dist., 342 F.Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (prayers at graduation upheld because at-
tendance not required).
86. 454 U.S. at 274 n.14 (college students can easily appreciate the significance of a
policy of neutrality as opposed to sponsorship, and are not as impressionable as younger
students). The same rationale prevailed in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). On the
facts of Widmar, it was found that no establishment existed. But the reasoning envinces an
intent to balance the two considerations.
87. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (requiring payment of unemployment
benefits to unemployed worker who refused, on religious grounds, to work on Saturday).
88. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983) may,
in fact, be the start of a new trend. See supra notes 82 and 84.
89. It was this consideration that Justice Stewart addressed in his Engel and
Schempp dissents. See supra notes 40 and 70 and accompanying text.
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